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destroying
such
species
certainly
establishes their ecological value, but
there is no reason whatsoever to
characterize this value as "aesthetic."
This is simply metaphorical claptrap.
The unity and balance within a
healthy ecosystem might be viewed as
analogous, in some respects, to the
unity and balance within an object of
beauty, but it is absu rd to attribute
"aesthetic value" to a particular spec
ies simply because it is an essential
part of that ecosystem.

Replies
(IN RE: E&A 11/4, Rowan's reply
to Cave's review of Russow's "Why Do
Species Matter?")
I n his reply to my review, Mr.
Andrew Rowan charges me (and Rus
sow) with making a "semantic error"
in speaking of the aesthetic value of a
species.
It is Mr. Rowan's reply,
rather, which is semantically con
fused. There is no error in speaking
of the aesthetic value of a species in
terms of human perceptions of beauty.
It is Mr. Rowan who stretches the
meaning of "aesthetic value" beyond
all reasonable bounds in contending
that
visually
unattractive
species
"have aesthetic value as parts of the
ecosystem."
The example which he
gives of the consequences of wantonly

Mr.
Rowan next proceeds to
argue, unconvincingly, for the relativ
ity of aesthetic value in the traditional
sense of beauty.
I will not dispute
the issue here as to whether beauty is
subjective or objective. It is not nec
essary, however, to maintain that
beauty is relative in order to draw
the conclusion
which
he draws,
namely, that "a species should not be
confined to a moral limbo" on asethetic
grounds.
This, indeed,
was the
whole point of my criticism of Russow,
and it is astonishing that Rowan could
have so misconstrued my review as to
accuse me of precisely what I was
criticizing. We evidently both wish to
safeguard the moral status of animals
against reduction to aesthetic criteria.
We differ only in the way we want to
do it.
Rowan wants to expand the
concept of aesthetics to i ncl ude the
pseudo-science of "ecological aesthet
ics. " My contention is that the dem
onstration of ecological value -- aesth
etic or otherwise -- fails to safeguard
the rights of animals and at bottom is
just as speciesist and homocentric as
the aesthetic value criterion in the
narrower sense which he rejects.
I
have yet to see an ecological argument
for animal rights which is rooted in
genuine moral concern for individual
animals rather than (ultimately) a con
cern for man's own survival.
George P. Cave�
Cave
Trans-Species Unlimited
Unlimited�
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(IN RE: E&A 11/4, Frey's reply
to Johnson's review of Frey's Inter
ests and Rights)
Reply to Frey
I am grateful for Frey's
elucidation of the intentions
skeptical book, I nte..!'...!!.ts and
The .Case ~9ainst Animals.
I
few more remarks of mine may
advance discussion.

careful
of his

B.l9J:Lt.!:

hope a
help to

I have considerable sympathy for
various forms of moral skepticism, and
I would certainly not dismiss any of
Frey's interesting questions just for
being startling or perverse.
When
Frey asks, for example, why we
should think that pain is intrinsically
bad, I perk up immediately: that
sounds like a deep question. It may
be so deep, in fact, as to be unans
werable.
Reflection on such matters
might nevertheless serve to tu rn ou r
entire moral thinking into a new direc
tion, or even incline us to give up
moral thin king altogether (probably
not) . Still, it is important not to get
confused about the practical conse
quences of theoretical obstacles.
If
the badness of pain is a theoretical
problem, it is one for humans as well
as nonhumans.
If we were reflecting
on the people who are bei ng tortu red
right now, or the people who are at
this very moment starving, it would
be odd to allow the theoretical ques
tion of why pain is bad to derail us
completely, if we were trying to make
some headway in thinkihg about prac
tical social policy.
I n the human
case, of course, this is obvious, and
so we don't have much difficulty sepa
rating our reflections into appropriate
layers. !! pain bad? doesn't mess us
up when we are asking Is torture
ever OK? I worry, though ,about the
nonhuman case, because it is so easy
to take a deep theoretical difficulty as
an
excuse
for
facile
practical

Do animals feel pain? Do animals
have interests? Is pain (intrinsically)
bad? I take it that Frey's answers to
these questions are:
Yes, No,and
Maybe not, respectively-.- I would
have thought that the answer to the
fi rst question (niggling neo-cartesian
niceties aside) would be Yes indeed I
In his book Frey does deny "that-'ani
mals have any of the following:
interests, desires, beliefs, language,
perceptions, reasons, emotions, moral
feelings. Nevertheless, he allows that
at least the "higher" animals can "suf
fer unpleasant sensations" and so can
be "hurt".
That, presumably, is
what we have in mind when we are
concerned about animals feeling pain.
But if we are confident about this
fact, then what exactly is the signifi
cance of the other questions?
It doesn't matter much if non
humans don't have interests or rights
unless (a) humans do, and (b) that
difference justifies differential- treat
ment. Traditional arguments denying
animals rights did assume a and b.
Frey may not be makings those
assumptions, and I applaud that. But
what's the upshot?
Frey says that "the very way
Johnson writes, of how animal welfare
ought to be weighed against human
welfare, obscures the upshot that my
attack on criteria for conferring moral
standing can or does have, namely,
that
unless this attack can
be
deflected, it is not clear that a par
ticular theorist, in terms of his own
theory, has anything to put on the
animal side of the balance." If ani
mals have no interests, Frey sug
gests, then there is nothing for theo
rists such as Feinberg and Singer to
put "on the animal side to weighed
against and to impede the pu rsuit of
human interests".

I must admit I am a little puzzled
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by this.
If animals can suffer
unpleasant sensations and so can be
hurt, in a way that demands justifica
tion (as Frey admits), then don't ani
mals have a welfare, a welfare that
requires moral consideration?
I am
not particularly concerned (now) to
tussle over the word 'welfare', or 'in
terest'. The point is just that there
certainly seems to be something to
weigh
against
human
interests-
-namely, the (fact of the) suffering
(or whatever you want to call those
unpleasant sensations) of nonhumans.
Is the (fact of the) suffering of non
humans unable to "impede the pursuit
of human interests "?
I don't see
why.
The fact that Frey emphasizes
the phrase 'in terms of his own theo
.!:i. suggestS-the following argument:
although
animals-not- having-unplea
sant-sensations does count, it cannot
fit into the theories of Feinberg and
Singer because it isn't an interest,
and thei r theories balance interests
against interests (nor can it fit into
Regan's theory because it isn't a
right, etc.).
Frey says, near the
end of his reply, that "a theorist
cannot weigh what he cannot get into
his theory in the first place, and if
my attack on the criteria for moral
standing
succeeds, then we
have strong grounds for thinking he
cannot encompass animals within his
theory" .
But what prevents, say, Singer
from weighing animals-not-having-un
pleasant-sensations
against
various
human interests, whether one chooses
to call what the animals have 'inter
ests' or not? Singer talks in terms of
weighing interests against interests
because he thinks that animals-not
having-unpleasant-sensations
is
an
interest that animals have.
Frey
argues in his book that it is not an
interest, if 0teres-.! is properly ana
lyzed. Suppose rp"ur~~ for the sake
of argument) that it isn t an interest.
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That doesn't show that Singer can't
weigh it against human interests.
In the fi nal footnote in Interests
and Rights: The Case Against Ani
mals, Frey says this: "If one does
come to agree that wantonly inflicting
unpleasant sensations on animals is
wrong, then an opponent may try . .
. to base the moral case for boycot
ting meat upon the pain and suffering
animals endure on factory farms,
without bringing in any or any
explicit concerns
with
interests. "
This possibility, says Frey, he is
dealing with in an unpublished book
on Modern Moral Vegetarianism.
I
haven It yet seen how he deals with it,
but that is the position that must be
dealt with and is not in I nterests and
Rights, which is why I said in my
review that Frey hadn't really pre
sented a case against animals.
If
there was such a case, I felt, it had
yet to be presented.
I look forward
to Frey's next attempt.
Edward Johnson
Johnson�
University of New Orleans
Orleans�
(IN RE: E&A \1/2, Devine's reply
to Gruzalski's review of Devine's "The
Moral Basis of Vegetarianism")
Response to Devine
In "The Moral Basis of Vegetari
anism," Philip Devine argued that
there is neither a utilitarian nor a
deontological justification for being a
vegetarian.
I n my criticism of his
account, I focused only on his misap
plication of utilitarianism. In his arti
cle, Devine had argued (a) that "ani
mal experience is so lacking in
intensity that the pains of animals are
overriden by the pleasu res experi
enced by human beings"(49l).
In
order to use (a) to reach the conclu
sion that eating animals was permissi
ble on utilitarian grounds, Devine
assumed (b) that an action which
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produces more pleasure than suffering
is permissible on utilitarian grounds.
In my criticism of Devine's apology for
conventional
omnivore behavior,
I
showed (a') that Devine's reasons for
thinking that animal experience lacks
intensity did not support the claim he
was making.
In particular, Devine
argued that conceptual richness makes
human experiences more intense, but I
showed that conceptual richness often
makes human experiences less intense
and also tends to make nonhuman suf
suf
fering extremely intense because non
non
human suffering is unmitigated by
rationalization, distraction, or aware
aware
ness of its purpose (this point is also
made in Alternatives to Pain, D.
Pratt,
pp-.--14-15).
Devine· also
argued that because animals cannot
!!y. to us that they are in pain, we
!!Y.
may be justified in thinking that their
pains are less intense. But, again, if
there is a problem about knowing
whether another sentient being is in
great pain, this problem will not be
solved by discovering that the crea
crea
tures utters the statement 'It hurts a
lot'.
That some beings are able to
replace loud
screams or whining
cringes with an utterance does not
alter ou r justification for thin king the
being is in great pain.
It is true
that we may have to become very fami
fami
lar with some kinds of nonhuman ani
ani
mals in order to gain sufficient exper
exper
tise to calibrate those pains that are
minor from their point of view, but
this does not support any weakening
of the utilitarian justification of vege
vege
tarianism, since, as far as we can
tell, the sufferings of nonhuman ani
ani
mals as they are raised and slaugh
slaugh
tered for thei r flesh are as intense as
any pains suffered by human animals.
Although this is sufficient to under
under
mine Devine's attack on the utilitarian
justification for vegetarianism, ~ also
showed (b') that the crucial utilitarian
calculation is not whether an action
will produce more pleasu re than pain,
but whether there is !!!y. alternative
to the action in question that would
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eroduce better results than the action
in guestion. If there is an alternative
that would likely produce less pain
and more pleasure on the whole, then
that is the action to be performed and
to do otherwise is to perform a wrong
action.
Hence, when calculating the
amount of human pleasu re produced
by eating flesh, the utilitarian is only
interested in the amount of pleasure
that would not occur were we to eat
tasty vegetables but ~ occurs
because of eating meat. Since there
is excellent evidence for thinking that
the amount of pleasure lost by eating
only vegetables hovers between the
minimal and the nonexistent, it follows
that the vegetarian alternative is man
man
dated by utilitarianism, for a minimal
or nonexistent amount of pleasure
would never outweigh the animal suf
suf
fering required to put flesh on the
table.
In his reply, Devine answers nei
nei
ther criticism, although either u nder
nder
mines his claim to have shown that
vegetarianism does not have a solid
and compelling moral basis.
Devine
does repeat a weak version of (a),
viz., "the precise issue is the weight
to be given the impoverished concep
concep
tual structu re of animal experience."
Of cou rse, this is even fu rther off
the mark, since what is at stake is
the value we are to place on animal
suffering, regardless of "conceptual
structure" or abilities to verbalize.
Rather than address criticisms (a')
and (b'), Devine attacks hedonistic
utilitarianism, claiming that hedonistic
utilitarianism culminates in "the rejec
rejec
tion of utilitarianism as a moral sys
sys
tem. " That is news to those who
articulate and defend hedonistic ver
ver
sions of utilitarianism. Surprisingly,
in the same paragraph Devine decides
to engage in "playing utilitarianism"
italics mine and so claims that he is
entitled "to exploit the complexities of
suffering and enjoyment."
But that
depends.
If what he means is that
there is some theory he can articulate
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that is utilitarian according to a text
book definition and that on this
theory eating animal flesh is permissi
ble, what would this show?
Any
strawman
account could
be con
structed, labeled 'utilitarian', and fail
to justify our obligations to animals
(e. g., imagine a theory in which the
only experiences that count among the
consequences of our actions are the
experiences of the human and the
divine). There is, unfortunately, no
paucity of inaccu rate and strawman
accounts of utilitarianism in the "Iiter
atu re". If . Devine is truly interested
in the question of whether utilitarian
ism
prescribes
vegetarianism,
he
would consider carefully the strongest
utilitarian accounts, among which is
hedonistic utilitarianism.
That Devine has failed to con
sider seriously my criticism of the
reasons he offered for (a) suggests
that he has no response or, perhaps,
that he was distracted, as we humans
often are.
That Devine does not
respond to my criticisms of (b) sug
gests that he does not take utilitarian
ism seriously enough to examine one
of its defensible forms. But for those
who do want to get the issue straight,
it is worth keeping in mind that the
utilitarian will at least consider the
following in assessing any action: (I)
the foreseeable consequences of the
action and the foreseeable conse
quences of the alternatives; (2) the
likelihood of these foreseeable conse
quences; (3) the value of these fore
seeable consequences in terms of pain
and pleasure for all the sentient
beings affected. Since the foreseeable
pleasu res of eating tasty vegetables
do not produce the intense foreseeable
sufferings
that
nonhuman
animals
experience in being raised and slaugh
tered for food, these three considera
tions constitute a strong case against
eating meat or doing anything else
that contributes to raising and slaugh
tering other sentient beings for their
flesh.
Bart Gruzalski
Northeastern University

(IN RE: E&A 11/3 and 11/4, Cave's
review of Russow's "Why Do Species
Matter?" and Rowan's I"eply thereto.)
Aesthetic Qualities and
Moral Judgments
In my article, "Why Do Species
Matter?", , came to the conclusion
that if there is a valid reason for pro
tecting endangered species that goes
at all beyond the duties we might
have not to harm or kill any animal of
comparable type, that reason can only
be grounded in an aesthetic apprecia
tion of individuals of that species.
This somewhat disappointing conclu
sion was reached by eliminating the
alternatives, and noting that the rea
sons with which we were left were
adequate to explain some of our puzz
ling intuitions about this complex
issue.
However, in their reviews of
this article, both George Cave (E&A
11/3, pp. 63-65) and Andrew Rowan
(E&A 11/4, pp. 92-93) take exception
with this conclusion. Since thei r rea
sons for doing so seem at first to be
quite different, I shall consider thei r
objections one at a time. However, I
will end by suggesting that there
might be a common concern underlying
both men's apparently disparate criti
cisms.
Dr. Rowan's objection seems to be
that an aesthetic judgment is subjec
tive, and hence untrustworthy; he
would prefer to tie ou r moral obliga
tions to something he refers to as
"ecological aesthetics." If this phrase
is meant to suggest that a creature's
adaptation to its envi ronment, its uni
que ecological fitness, might inspire
aesthetic feelings of admiration and
wonder, I would certainly agree with
him, and acknowledged this facet of
our aesthetic evaluation in my original
article (p. 109,111).
If, on the
other hand, he means that we ought
to recognize that an animal has some
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other sort of value which accrues to it
in virtue of its occupying a certain
role in the ecosystem, then his sug·
gestion does not differ obviously from
the claim I considered in my article,
and rejected on the grounds that it
simply does not yield the conse
quences that its proponents claim to
generate.
In particular, it does not
support that conclusion that all, or
even most, species can be shown to
be valuable on this criterion (pp.
106-108),
Mr. Cave's objections are consider
ably more subtle, but I believe that
they, too, can be answered.
The
fi rst objection is that my proposed
solution is "thoroughly speciesist" (p.
63) and the second is that my solution
rests on a confusion between those
featu res that provide psychological
motivation for an action, and that that
provide moral justification for it.
Underlying both these points is an
issue about which Cave and I disa
gree: the question of whether a
thing's aesthetic value has any bear
ing on moral judgments about actions
which affect that thing. Cave explic
itly rejects the idea that "beauty has
moral value", claiming that this tenet
is "a moral disaster" that has been
used to justify such clearly immoral
actions as slave labor (p. 64). Cave
is correct in ascribing to me the
opposite point of view; my position
does, as he clearly sees, presuppose
that a thing's being beautiful might be
used to justify the claim that we have
a moral obligation to preserve it.
I,
acknowledge that beauty ought not to
be taken as the sole ground for moral
value (i. e. that -other considerations
might outweigh a particular obligation
based solely on aesthetic value--cf. p.
111 of the original article). I grant,
too, that history and imagination can
provide examples in which appeals to
aesthetic value are used in attempts to
justify immoral activities.
Neither of
these
considerations,
however,
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provides any reason for thinking that
beauty, or aesthetic value more gen
erally, should play no role in our
moral deliberations. Indeed, our intu
itions certainly lead us to think that
they should: someone who defiles a
great work of art is normally consid
ered to have done something immoral.
A full exploration of the relation
between aesthetic and moral value
would require a paper (at least) of its
own, but I believe it is sufficient for
the present purposes to note that
Cave has not supplied adequate reason
to warrant abandoning the intuition
that aesthetic value can support some
claims about moral obligations.
If; however, I am justified in
appealing to aesthetic value as one
possible component in our moral delib
erations, then both of Cave's specific
objections lose their force.
As I
understand the word 'speciesist', it is
not speciesist to appeal to a human
value--i. e., to argue that something
has moral worth because it is valuable
to humans--as long as it is not
assumed that any human value will
outweigh nonhuman concerns. Thus,
if animals have a right to life, it
would certainly seem speciesist to
claim that it is morally permissible to
ignore that right in cases where we
I did
simply found the animal ugly.
nothing of this sort in my arguments
concerning endangered species; my
appeal to aesthetic value was pre
sented as something which might sup
plement those moral concerns which
apply to any individual animal of a
give type,
which might plausibly
explain those conerns for endangered
species which extend beyond the moral
considerations governing our treatment
of cows, dogs, blackbirds, and labo
ratory rats.
. As to the second objection, it
would seem that if aesthetic considera
tions are morally relevant, they can
legitimately act both as psychological
motivation and as an element in moral
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justification.
We might well wish to
keep the distinction between motiva
tion and justification in mind, espe
cially if one is to deal with questions
about cases in which an agent fails to
recognize that something is beautiful,
or cases in which mistakes in aesthetic
judgments are made, but that, I take
it, is not Cave's point.
Rather, he
seems to think that if something is a
psychological motivation to act,
it
cannot be part of the moral justifica
tion for that act; I can see no reason
to accept this premise.
Both Cave's and Rowan's objections
seem as if they might be linked to a
worry that ou r aesthetic judgments
might, after all, be an unreliable
guide to moral action. Cave suggests
that over-concern with beauty can
lead to speciesist perspectives and
immoral actions.
Rowan quotes Hume
in order to suggest that aesthetics
supplies a very limited perspective
and "flimsy and subjective grounds"
for our moral judgments (p. 93). All
of this may be true; aesthetic judg
ments are notoriously hard to pin
down, and we· certainly have much
work to do in the a rea of aesthetic
value and its role in ethics. Nonethe
less, if my original arguments are
correct, it's the only game in town as
far as endangered species are con
cerned.
Lilly-Marlene Russow
Russow�
Pu rdue University
University�

